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ARE STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS AGAINST GENERIC DRUG
MANUFACTURERS ALWAYS PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL LAW?
WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG IN SAYING YES
DRAGER v. PLIVA USA, INC., 741 F.3D 470 (4TH CwR. 2014)
Benjamin A. Hooper
I. INTRODUCTION
Envision yourself going to the emergency room because you are
suffering from a bad stomachache and bouts of nausea. Without telling
you, the nurse injects you with an anti-nausea drug to alleviate your
symptoms. This injection then results in a gangrene infection that
ultimately concludes with the necessary amputation of your arm. When
you try to bring suit against the drug manufacturer for a faulty warning
label, the case is dismissed on federal preemption grounds, leaving you
with no recourse. You later discover that you were injected with a
generic form of the anti-nausea drug rather than the brand-name version,
and this distinction alone resulted in your case's dismissal. This is the
situation that Debbie Schork found herself in after she was injected with
promethazine, the generic form of Phenergan. 1
Schork's nurse properly injected the anti-nausea medicine directly
into her arm, but accidently inserted the medicine into her artery while
doing so.2 This error ultimately resulted in the loss of her arm.' She
brought suit against the manufacturers of the generic drug, but the trial
court dismissed her case, reasoning that a recent Supreme Court
decision in Wyeth v. Levine effectively barred all failure to warn claims
brought in state courts against generic manufacturers. 5
This result is in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in
Wyeth v. Levine, a case involving almost identical facts. In that case,
Diana Levine, like Ms. Schork, was injected with anti-nausea
medication and lost her arm. 6  However, she was injected with
Phenergan, the brand-name medication, rather than the genericequivalent.7 Unlike the trial court's result in Ms. Schork's case, the
1. Katie Thomas, Generic Drugs Proving Resistant to Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/business/drug-lawsuits-hinge-on-the-detail-of-a-
label.html?pagewanted=1/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
5. Thomas, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
1
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Supreme Court held that Levine's suit was not barred by federal
preemption. 8
The current outlook for patients who receive generic drugs is bleak.
According to many courts, Supreme Court precedent mandates that
patients using brand name drugs may recover from manufacturers in
failure to warn lawsuits, while those using generic drugs may not.9 This
is especially troubling considering that nearly eight out of every ten
prescriptions filled are for generic drugs. 10 Though the FDA classifies
generic drugs as the chemical equivalent of brand-name drugs, 11 a
person effectively relinquishes his or her legal rights regarding failure to
warn when receiving a generic drug, as opposed to its branded version.
This Casenote focuses on the circuit split surrounding federal
preemption analysis with regard to failure to warn claims brought
against generic drug manufacturers as demonstrated in the Fifth Circuit
case, Morris v. PLIVA, Inc.,12 and the Sixth Circuit case, Fulgenzi v.
PLIVA, Inc.. 13 In particular, this Casenote focuses on another recent
decision on this issue, coming from the Fourth Circuit in Drager v.
PLIVA USA, Inc.14 In Drager, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiffs
state tort claims for failure to warn were preempted by the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 15  Part H of this Casenote provides an
overview of federal preemption standards and FDCA requirements for
branded and generic drug manufacturers and discusses two important
Supreme Court cases that have directly addressed these issues. Part III
examines the circuit split that has arisen regarding this issue and outlines
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Drager. Part IV analyzes the Fourth
Circuit's decision and discusses the errors of its rationale. Finally, Part
V concludes that state tort law claims brought against drug
manufacturers should not be preempted by federal law in all
circumstances. Additionally, Part V examines past Supreme Court
decisions and discusses their proper interpretation.
8. Id.
9. A Bizzare Outcome on Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytirnes.com/2012/03/24/opinion/a-bizarre-outcome-on-generic-
drugs.html?_r=2&scp =l&sq=bizarre%20outcome%20geneic%20drugs&st=cse&/.
10. FDA.Gov, FACTS ABouT GENERIC DRUGS (DRUGS),
http://www fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggeneric
drugs/ucm167991.htm/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
11. Id.
12. 713 F.3d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 2013).
13. 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013).
14. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014).
15. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Standards Behind Federal Preemption
Preemption arguments arise from the Supremacy Clause contained in
article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 16 The Supremacy
Clause establishes that "federal law may supersede state law in several
different ways."'17 First, federal law may supersede state law through
express terms established by Congress. 18 Of course, Congress must be
acting within its constitutional limits when mandating express
preemption. 19
The second avenue of federal preemption is through a finding of
implied preemption. The Supreme Court has outlined two categories
of implied preemption: (1) "whole field" preemption, where the scheme
of a federal regulation is so comprehensive that it is reasonable to infer
that "Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state law"; and (2)
conflict preemption, where state law is nullified because it directly
conflicts with federal law. 2 1 Conflict preemption is found when either
(1) "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility"; or (2) state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 22 Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that there is a
presumption amongst courts against the dismissal of suits on preemption
grounds, "particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated... in a
field which the states have traditionally occupied."23 The Court has
further emphasized the states' "historic primacy" in the areas of health
and safety. 4 According to the Court, Congress's ultimate purpose and
intent of the statute is the main factor against which a preemption claim
must be weighed. 25
One example of state and federal laws that did not conflict under the
Supremacy Clause can be seen in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul. In Paul, Florida avocado growers challenged a California
regulation that prohibited the sale or transportation, in California, of
avocados containing less than eight percent of oil by weight (a standard
16. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985).
17. Id. at 713.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Hillsborough Cy., 471 U.S. at 713.
23. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 485-86.
3
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26used by California to gauge the maturity of avocados). In contrast,
federal regulations placed no significance on oil content when gauging
the maturity of avocados grown in Florida. 27 Among other claims, the
Florida avocado growers challenged the California statute by asserting
that it was preempted by federal regulations. 28
In dismissing the claim, the Court first noted that no "physical
impossibility" existed which would prevent Florida growers from
complying with both federal and state standards29 and further concluded
that Congress did not intend to "oust or displace state powers to enact
the regulation." 30  Importantly, the Court noted that the areas of
consumer protection and safety are typically left to the states and "in the
absence of an express command from Congress," states may impose
higher standards for their consumers. 31
Alternatively, an example of conflicting state and federal laws can be
seen in Hines v. Dadowitz.32 In Hines, the state of Pennsylvania argued
that the Alien Registration Act (Pennsylvania Act) it passed was not
preempted by a federal act requiring different registration requirements
for aliens. 33  The Court held that the Pennsylvania Act was indeed
preempted by the federal act because Congress had implemented a
comprehensive scheme, "a complete system for alien registration." 34
Therefore, the Pennsylvania Act was necessarily in conflict with the
federal scheme, and as a result, was preempted by the federal act.35
B. Requirements for Generic Manufacturers Under the FDCA
Before a drug may be marketed in the United States, the FDA must
approve it.36 The FDCA establishes the approval processes for both
branded and generic drug manufacturers. The requirements for
branded manufacturers are not the same as those required of generic
drug manufacturers. For example, branded manufacturers that wish to
introduce a new drug to the marketplace must first submit an
26. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133 (1963).
27. Id. at 134.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 143.
30. Id. at 152.
31. Fla. Lime &Avocado, 373 U.S. at 144.
32. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
33. Id. at 60.
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id. at 73-74.
36. FDA.GOv, supra note 10.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2015).
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application. 38  This application must include, amongst other
requirements, full reports of investigations made into the safety and
effectiveness of the proposed drug, a list of components used in the
drug, and a full description of the methods used in the drug's
manufacture, processing, and packing.39 Additionally, the application
must provide a label that explains the proper use and possible risks
associated with using the drug in accordance with the directions.4 0 This
application is referred to as a New Drug Application (NDA).4 1
The approval process for generic drug manufacturers differs from the
NDA procedure. Rather than filing a NDA, generic drug manufacturers
are only required to submit an abbreviated NDA (ANDA) to obtain
42approval. An ANDA for a drug must include information that the drug
contains the same active ingredients as, and for all practical purposes is
the same as, a drug that has already been approved (the "listed drug"). 43
Additionally, the ANDA requires that the labeling of the proposed drug
be the same as the labeling of the listed drug. 44
The labeling standards for approved drugs also contain differences
depending on whether the drug is being distributed by a branded or
generic manufacturer. A branded manufacturer can unilaterally update
its labels, although this update is subject to subsequent FDA
disapproval. 4 5  A branded manufacturer may seek to update a label
through either a "Prior Approval" supplement, which requires FDA
approval, or through a "Changes Being Effected" (CBE) supplement. 46
A CBE supplement can be submitted up to 30 days prior to distribution
of the drug and does not require FDA approval.47
Generic drug manufacturers, on the other hand, "must maintain
labeling consistent with their branded counterpart."4 8  A variation in
labeling between the two allows the FDA to withdraw its previous
approval of the generic drug.4 9  Additionally, generic drug
manufacturers may use only the CBE process to update their labels to
match their branded counterparts or to follow the FDA's instructions. 50
38. Id. § 355(b)(1).
39, Id.
40. Id.
41. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2013).
42. Id.
43, 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2) (2015).
44. Id. § 355(j)(2)(v).
45. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 581.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 581.
5
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Therefore, generic drug manufacturers cannot unilaterally decide to
change the label of a generic drug. They do, however, have a federal
duty of "sameness" with regard to their branded counterparts.51 This
duty requires generic manufacturers to update their labels if their
branded counterparts have done so.
C. Federal Preemption Applied to Drug Manufacturers
The Supreme Court recently examined the issue of federal preemption
in state tort law claims against both branded and generic
manufacturers. Though both cases dealt with drug manufacturers, the
Court reached two different results on the issue of whether state tort law
claims were preempted by the FDCA regulations. 53
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a state tort claim against a branded manufacturer was barred by
federal preemption because of the FDA's approval of the drug's
labeling. Wyeth was the manufacturer of the drug Phenergan. It had
filed a NDA with the FDA in 1955 and subsequently made changes to
the drug's labeling, which the FDA approved. 5 The lawsuit arose after
a patient was injected with Phenergan and developed gangrene, a
condition that ultimately resulted in the amputation of her entire forearm
and hand.55 Because the patient was a professional musician, she also
56lost her livelihood as a result of the injection.
The main contention in the case concerned the adequacy of the
warnings that were located on the injectable form of Phenergan.5 7 There
are two ways to administer the injectable form of Phenergan according
to the label: (1) intravenously, where the drug is injected directly into a
patient's vein, or (2) through the "IV-drip" method, where the drug is
58introduced through a saline bag connected to a patient's vein. Levine
argued that, although the Phenargan label warned about the dangers of
the intravenous method, the label failed to instruct physicians that they
should use the IV-drip method.59
At the trial court level, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Levine,
51. Id. at 582.
52. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct.
2567 (2011).
53. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559.
54. Id. at 558.
55. Id. at 559.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559.
59. Id. at 560.
[VOL. 84
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which was subsequently affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court.60
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed these decisions and
dismissed Wyeth's preemption claims, finding that it was not impossible
for Wyeth to satisfy both federal and state regulations simultaneously. 61
The Court reasoned that Wyeth had the ability to unilaterally update its
labeling for Phenergan without the consent of the FDA through the CBE
process, though this change would need to be subsequently approved.62
Nonetheless, the Court found that there was no concrete evidence that if
Wyeth had updated the label to strengthen its warnings, the FDA would
have disapproved of such changes. 63  Because Wyeth could have
updated its warning labels to bring them into compliance with Vermont
State law without violating the FDA regulations, the state tort law claim,
which rested on the alleged inadequacy of the warning labels under state
law, was not preempted by the FDA regulations. 64
In addition to rejecting Wyeth's argument of impossibility, the Court
also found that Congress, by enacting the FDA regulatoryi scheme, did
not intend for federal law to preempt all state law claims. Indeed, the
Court noted that there has been a "longstanding coexistence of state and
federal law and the FDA's traditional recognition of state-law-
remedies. ' 66 The Court found that a state failure-to-warn claim against
a branded manufacturer is not preempted by federal regulations
concerning pharmaceutical drugs.67
The Court took a different approach when examining federal
preemption in the context of generic drug manufacturers. The Court
addressed this issue in 2011 with its decision in PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing.68 In this case, Mensing and another individual (Respondents),
were prescribed the drug Reglan in 2001, but were given the generic
69form by their pharmacists. The FDA first approved the distribution
and sale of Reglan in 1980 and five years later generic manufacturers
began to produce the drug.70 Over the years, evidence showed that the
drug had a high risk of causing tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological
disorder.71 Starting in 1980, the labels for Reglan were modified several
60. Id. at 563.
61. Id. at571.
62. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570.
63. Id. at 573.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 580.
67. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581.
68. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011)
69. Id. at 2568.
70. Id. at 2572.
71. Id.
7
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times. First, in 1985, the labels were updated to warn of the risk of
tardive dyskinesia and to caution that treatment beyond twelve weeks
72had not been evaluated and could not be recommended. A
modification was again submitted and approved by the FDA for Reglan
in 2004. This modification stated "therapy should not exceed 12
weeks."73 Finally, a black box warning was added to Reglan in 2009,
which stressed that treatment should not exceed twelve weeks except in
rare cases.74 Respondents took the generic form of Reglan in 2001,
before Reglan contained the 2004 and 2009 updated warnings.75
The Supreme Court found that federal law preempted Respondents'
state law tort claims, reasoning that it was impossible for the generic
manufacturers to satisfy both state and federal regulations
simultaneously. 76  The Court acknowledged that the FDA requires
generic manufacturers to contact the FDA regarding stronger warning
labels when they discover information necessitating increased
warnings. 77  Nonetheless, the Court found that under the FDA
regulations, generic manufacturers could not unilaterally strengthen
labels, and therefore, it was impossible for a manufacturer to satisfy
both its federal duty of "sameness" as well as state law requirements. 78
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Morris v. PLIVA, Inc.
1. District Court Decision
In 2009, plaintiffs Penny and John Morris filed a complaint alleging
damages that arose from Mrs. Morris's ingestion of the drug
metoclopramide. 79 Though the drug was available in both generic and
brand formulations, Mrs. Morris received the generic metoclopramide. 80
In her complaint, she alleged that she had taken the metoclopramide
tablets from early 2006 through July 2008 and had developed tardive
72. Id.
73. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at2581.
77. Id. at 2578.
78. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578.
79. Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-854, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109219, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 23,
2009).
80. Id.
[VOL. 84
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dyskinesia as a result. 8 1 This neurological condition causes involuntary
movements, as well as other symptoms.82 Morris brought her action
against five separate defendants, all of whom manufactured
metoclopramide either in its generic or branded form.
83
The District Court granted summary judgment to two of the named
defendants, Wyeth and Schwarz, because Morris did not dispute that she
had ingested generic metoclopramide, a product that neither
manufacturer distributed. 84 Contesting this finding, the plaintiffs argued
that while these manufacturers had not provided the form of
metoclopramide that Morris had taken, their position as the branded
manufacturers of the drug nonetheless made them liable for damages. 85
Specifically, Morris argued that generic manufacturers are limited in
their ability to update warning labels unilaterally and must maintain the
same label as the branded counterpart of their drug. 86 Dismissing these
arguments, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against both
Wyeth and Schwarz.87
On January 27, 2011 the district court stayed proceedings against the
remaining defendants, all of whom were generic manufacturers, because
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, a
lawsuit with a similar fact pattern.88 Once the decision in Mensing had
been reached, the district court relied entirely on the Supreme Court's
reasoning to determine that Morris's state law claim for failure to warn
was preempted by federal law. 89 Specifically, the district court found
that it was impossible for generic manufacturers to comply
simultaneously with both their federal regulatory duties and state law
duties to warn.90
2. Fifth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs case de novo.
91
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Morris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109219 at *9.
85. Id. at *10.
86. Id. at *11.
87. Id. at *15.
88. Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-854, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121052, *2 (W.D. La. Oct.
19, 2011).
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Morris v. PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 2013) (dismissing the plaintiff's case for
failure to state a claim).
9
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Based on its review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that plaintiffs state law claims against the generic drug manufacturers
were preempted by FDA regulations. 92 The court found that PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing was controlling and therefore, the plaintiffs state law
claims were preempted.93 Morris argued that Mensing should not apply
with regard to her failure to warn claim because PLIVA failed to update
its label on the generic drug to make it consistent with a 2004 label
change to its branded counterpart, Reglan.94 The Fifth Circuit found
that Mensing "forecloses such claims because failure to 'communicate'
extends beyond just a label change." 95 The Court reasoned that in order
to avoid liability under this theory, the generic manufacturers not only
would have had to update their labels, but also "take affirmative steps to
alert consumers, doctors, or pharmacists of changes in the drug label." 96
Therefore, the Court found that because no branded manufacturers had
sent out such warnings, generic manufacturers were not at liberty to
send out such warnings themselves.9 7  The Court reasoned that this
triggered preemption because PLIVA was then unable to comply with
both its state law duty to warn and the federal law duty of sameness. 98
The plaintiffs also argued that the generic drug manufacturers failed
to test and inspect the drug in accordance with federal law. 99 The Fifth
Circuit quickly dismissed this claim, pointing to the FDCA, which
"provides no right of action for these violations."' 100 The plaintiffs' final
argument that PLIVA had violated an express warranty by placing a
defective product into the stream of commerce was also denied. In so
doing, the Court noted that the Fifth Circuit has rejected this type of
claim in the past.' 10
B. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc.
1. District Court Decision
Only a month after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Morris, the Sixth
Circuit addressed the same type of failure to warn claim, again brought
92. Id. at 775.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Id.
96. Morris, 713 F.3d at 777.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 778.
100. Id.
101. Morris, 713 F.3d at 778.
[VOL. 84
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against PLIVA. 102 Similar to the plaintiff in Morris, Eleanor Fulgenzi
brought a state tort suit against the generic manufacturer PLIVA for
failure to adequately warn of the risks of the drug metoclopramide. 10 3
Fulgenzi had taken the drug for three months in 2004, as well as for a
year between 2006 and 2007.104 Much like the plaintiff in Morris, she
alleged that as a result of taking the drug she had developed tardive
dyskinesia. 10 5
Relying on the holding in Mensing, the district court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the failure-to-warn claims
brought by Fulgenzi were "clearly preempted under Mensing."'10 6 The
court also found that there was no exception to preemption of a state law
failure to warn claim based on the failure to comply with FDA
regulations. 107  The district court concluded that "regardless of how
Plaintiff attempts to cast these claims they are at the core, failure-to-warn claims" and are therefore preempted under Mensing.108
2. Sixth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined, de novo, the question of
whether the FDA regulations preempted the plaintiffs state law failure
to warn claim. 10 9 Fulgenzi argued that her case was different from
Mensing because the branded manufacturer of Reglan, Schwarz Pharma,
had sought and received approval from the FDA for a labeling change to
the drug in 2004.110 PLIVA never updated its metoclopramide labeling
to include the new warning that was present in its branded counterpart
which cautioned against use of the drug for longer than twelve weeks.111
Fulgenzi argued that this failure to update in accordance with Reglan's
new warnings in 2004 removed the impossibility for PLIVA to comply
with federal and state duties. 112
In analyzing whether Fulgenzi's claim was preempted by federal law,
the Sixth Circuit noted that two factors need be considered: (1) whether
compliance with both the state and federal law was impossible; and (2)
whether the state requirement is an obstacle to the purposes and
102. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 579.
104. Id. at 580.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 582.
107. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 582.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 583.
110. Id. at 580.
111. Id.
112. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 580.
11
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objectives of Congress.113 The existence of either of these factors would
result in a finding that the plaintiff's case was preempted.
While considering the first factor, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that
the key question presented in Mensing was "whether the private party
(PLIVA) could independently comply" with its state duty. In Wyeth,
the Court held that no impossibility exists when "approval comes after
the independent action of the private party." 115 The court noted that,"not only could PLIVA have independently updated its labeling to
match that of the branded manufacturer through the CBE process.., but
it had a federal duty to do so." 116 The court went on to state that while
the FDA had the authority to reject a change made by PLIVA after the
fact, this "possibility of impossibility" was found insufficient under
Wyeth and, therefore, Fulgenzi's claim was not preempted for
impossibility. 117
Addressing the second factor of preemption analysis, the Sixth Circuit
determined that state tort suits against generic manufacturers would not
frustrate the "purposes and objectives" of Congress. 118  The court
stressed that "70 years of Congressional failure to enact an express
preemption provision for prescription drugs--despite the enactment of
an express provision for medical devices-to be 'powerful evidence'
that Congress did not intend to preempt state remedies." 119 The court
further held that, though there is a legitimate concern that Fulgenzi "is
simply attempting to enforce a federal-law violation through state
litigation," her claim is based solely on state tort law principles and
therefore the cause of action remained valid. 12  Ultimately, the Sixth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion than the Fifth Circuit in Morris
and found that the Supreme Court's holding in Mensing did not prevent
Fulgenzi from bringing her action. 12 1
C. Main Case: Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.
1. District Court Decision
More recently, a circuit court addressed the issue of federal
113. Id. at 584.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 584.
118. Id. at 586.
119. Id. at 585.
120. Id. at 586.
121. Id. at 589.
[VOL. 84
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preemption in relation to state law tort claims against generic drug
manufacturers in the Fourth Circuit in 2014.122 The plaintiff, Drager,
brought a claim against PLIVA as the personal representative of the
estate of Shirley Gross. 123 The facts are nearly identical to the previous
two cases; Mrs. Gross had taken the generic form of the drug Reglan
and used the medication for more than twelve weeks. 12 4  Like the
plaintiffs in Morris and Fulgenzi, Gross also developed permanent
injuries, including tardive dyskinesia. 125
Gross first filed suit against PLIVA in 2010, but the district court
stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court's ruling in
Mensing.126 After the decision in Mensing, the district court granted a
motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of PLIVA, stating that all
of Gross's claims were preempted by the FDCA pursuant to Mensing.
127
Additionally, the court denied the plaintiffs motion to amend her
complaint to include allegations that PLIVA had failed to update its
label in accordance with the updated labels of Reglan in 2004, stating
that such an amendment would be futile under Maryland law. 128
2. Fourth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the decision to grant PLIVA's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 129  The court relied on the
holding in Mensing to determine that PLIVA could not have unilaterally
changed the labels on the generic form of Reglan and therefore, could
not satisfy both Maryland and federal law simultaneously. 130 According
to the Fourth Circuit this left PLIVA with only one option: to stop
selling the drug altogether. The court found that this solution was not
tenable and that a manufacturer's ability to leave the marketplace or face
liability for state law claims was not a valid means of avoiding a ruling
of preemption.131
Drager also contended on appeal that the district court had abused its
discretion by denying Drager's amended complaint, which would have
included a similar claim to that allowed by the Sixth Circuit in Fulgenzi.
More specifically, this claim would have alleged liability based on
122. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014).
123. Id. at 473.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Drager, 741 F.3d at 473.
128. Id. at 474.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 477.
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PLIVA's failure to update its label in 2004 in accordance with the
updated Reglan label. 32  The Fourth Circuit brushed this argument
aside, stating that the motion to amend the complaint had not been
"properly made" at the district court level and, therefore, it must be
treated as having been waived. 133
IV. WHERE THE FOURTH CIRCUIT WENT WRONG
The Fourth Circuit erred by finding that Drager's state tort law claims
were preempted by federal law. In reaching this decision, the Court
misconstrued the Supreme Court's holding in Mensing. Specifically, the
Court failed to complete a full preemption analysis and did not consider
the factual differences present in Drager's case as compared to Mensing.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider whether allowance of
Drager's state law claim would frustrate the purposes and objectives of
Congress. Finally, the Court did not consider the unfairness toward
injured plaintiffs that is created by deeming these types of claims
preempted by federal law. All of these gaps in the Court's reasoning
suggest that a new outlook may be necessary for how courts should treat
failure to warn claims against generic and branded drug manufacturers.
A. The Fourth Circuit Applied the Mensing Rationale Too Broadly
1. The Court Failed to Perform a Complete Preemption Analysis
One of the biggest problems with the Fourth Circuit's finding of
preemption was its failure to perform a complete preemption analysis.
The appellate court noted that the district court had failed to complete a
"full preemption analysis" and that "Mensing contemplates a more
complete analysi3s," but found that this alone did not constitute
reversible error. Instead of analyzing each of Drager's claims
individually, the Fourth Circuit lumped them all together, generalizing
that each cause of action would necessitate PLIVA to either change its
labeling, exit the market, or face liability, and therefore, the claims were135
preempted. This generalization of all of Drager's claims does not
follow from the holding in Mensing.
In Mensing, the Court found that the ultimate question of whether a
state tort law claim would be preempted centered on whether the
132. Drager, 741 F.3d at 474.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 476.
135. Id.
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manufacturer could not comply with both state and federal duties
simultaneously. 136 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court did not state
that failure to warn or failure to update cases will always be preempted
by federal law, but instead that it depends on the question of
impossibility. 137 The Court noted that this question must be answered
on a case-by-case basis 138 and that it did not intend to create a blanket
rule. Such a rule would require that all failure to warn claims brought
against generic drug manufacturers be considered preempted by federal
law.
This type of case by case analysis can be seen in the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Fulgenzi. In that case, which was decided after Mensing, the
Court held that federal law did not preempt the plaintiff's failure to warn
claim. 139 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit noted that "the Court's decision
[in Mensing] rested squarely on the impossibility-preemption analysis
and did not suggest that all suits against generic-drug manufacturers
would be preempted."' 140 The Fourth Circuit neglected to consider this
principle and instead determined that if Drager's claims involved the
need to change labels or warnings, then the claims must be preempted,
even though the generic manufacturer could have complied with FDA
regulations and state law by conforming to the actions of the branded
manufacturer. 141
Instead of taking this blanket approach, the Fourth Circuit should
have taken a deeper look into the question of impossibility and how it
specifically affected Drager's failure to warn claim. In particular, the
Fourth Circuit should have examined what options PLIVA had in
regards to updating its label. While it is true that PLIVA could not
unilaterally update its label unless that update would reflect an identical
change of its branded counterpart, Schwarz Pharma, the branded
manufacturer, had proposed and received FDA approval for such a label
change in 2004.142 PLIVA, however, never updated its metoclopramidelabeling to include this new warning and failed to communicate the
136. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011).
137. Id. at 2577.
138. Id. at 2580. The Court discussed the difficulty that can arise in determining whether a party
can sufficiently satisfy both federal duties and state duties simultaneously. The Court noted that this
particular case does not pose such a challenge but does not go so far as to say that all failure to warn
claims against generic manufacturers will be answered so easily.
139. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2013).
140. Id. at 583.
141. See Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc. 741 F.3d 470, 477 (4th Cir. 2014). The court stated that any
duty under Maryland law would have required PLIVA to change its warnings and therefore the claims
must be preempted as this would result in impossibility.
142. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 579.
15
Hooper: Are State Law Tort Claims Against Generic Drug Manufacturers Alwa
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
change to any physicians. 14 3 The Fourth Circuit appeared to overlook
this crucial fact in making its determination. Because Schwarz had
updated its Reglan label, PLIVA not only had the ability to update its
label on metoclopramide, but also had a federal duty of "sameness" to
include the new warning. 144  By reading Mensing too broadly, the
Fourth Circuit was able to dismiss Drager's claim solely because it was
against a generic manufacturer for failure to update its labeling. The
Court erred by taking this approach because it failed to consider the fact-
specific basis of Drager's claim.
2. The Court Did Not Consider the Factual Differences
The factual differences between the plaintiff in Mensing and Shirley
Gross in Drager are easily distinguishable and, accordingly, require a
different result. In Mensing, the plaintiffs, Gladys Mensing and Julie
Demahy, were both prescribed Reglan in 2001 and 2002,
respectively. 14 5  Each was given the generic equivalent by her
pharmacist, and each took the drug for multiple years, leading to the
development of tardive dyskinesia. 1 6 The date on which these plaintiffs
were prescribed, and took the drug, is of great importance. As discussed
previously, Schwarz Pharma updated the warning labels on Reglan in
2004, after each of the plaintiffs in Mensing had ingested the generic
form. This is at odds with the timeframe in which Mrs. Gross ingested
the drug in Drager. Specifically, Gross used the generic form of Reglan
between the years 2006 to 2007.147 This factual difference has a large
impact upon the impossibility preemption question.
In Mensing, the Court stated that the determination of whether a party
can satisfy both federal and state duties "sometimes may be difficult to
determine. But this is not such a case."' 148  However, the factual
differences present in Drager made this determination much more
difficult. Mensing was a 5-4 decision accompanied by a strong dissent
arguing the majority had extended the preemption doctrine to situations
where there was only the "mere possibility of impossibility."' 149 The
factual differences in the Drager case actually allow for a finding,
143. Id.
144. Id. at 578. The Sixth Circuit concluded that PL1VA's failure to update its label on the
generic form of metoclopramide was in violation of its federal duty and presented an even weaker case
for impossibility preemption than in Wyeth where a branded manufacturer failed to succeed on an
impossibility preemption argument.
145. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011).
146. Id.
147. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2014).
148. Mensing, 121 S. Ct. at 2580.
149. Id. at 2582. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
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consistent with Mensing, that PLIVA did not suffer from any
impossibility at all. Once Schwarz Pharma had updated the Reglan label
in 2004, PL1VA was authorized to update its own labels and could have
satisfied both its federal and state duties.
The Sixth Circuit came to such a conclusion in Fulgenzi, determining
that because the plaintiff had taken the generic form of Reglan only after
2004, her claim was not preempted because PLIVA had an avenue, and
a duty, to update its labels. The Fourth Circuit erred by not reaching an
identical conclusion.
3. The "Purposes and Objectives" Analysis Was Never Considered
When examining conflict preemption, as the Fourth Circuit did in
Drager, preemption may be found by two methods. The Court
examined the first method, but after reaching its conclusion decided not
to mention the second-whether compliance with state law would act as
an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. 150 As discussed
above, the court relied too greatly on its broad reading of Mensing to
determine that conflict preemption was present because of impossibility,
completely ignoring the second method of analysis. The Supreme Court
has stated that there is a presumption against dismissal of suits on
preemption grounds, "particularly in those in which Congress has
'legislated ... in a field which the states have traditionally occupied." 151
The fields of health and safety have been noted to be of "historic
primacy" to the states. 152
Because Drager's case should not have been preempted based on
impossibility, the Court should have determined whether the pursuit of
such state claims would hinder the purposes and objectives of Congress.
As noted by the Sixth Circuit, Congress has failed to enact any express
preemption provision for prescription drugs, despite the fact that such a
provision has been enacted for medical devices. 153  The dissent in
Mensing echoed this reasoning, stating the majority's approach,
"threatens to infringe the State's authority over traditional matters of
state interest-such as the failure-to-warn claims here-when Congress
expressed no intent to pre-empt state law." 154 There is no evidence that
Congress intended to preempt the type of claims brought by Drager, nor
is there an indication that allowance of such claims would clash with
Congress's purposes and objectives. As neither of these are present, it is
150. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985).
151. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
152. Id.
153. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2013).
154. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2589 (2011) (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
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clear that this method of preemption would not apply to Drager's claims.
B. The Court Did Not Consider the Unfairness that Results from
Its Ruling
The Fourth Circuit's determination that generic manufacturers should
be treated differently than branded manufacturers has wide ranging
implications that most consumers will be unaware of until they suffer an
injury and seek legal recourse. Over the past ten years, generic drugs
have been dispensed at an increasing rate, rising from sixty-three
percent of dispensed prescriptions in 2006 to seventy-eight percent in
2010.155 This shift toward generic drugs is not surprising considering
that many pharmacists recommend them to patients as being just as
effective as their branded counterparts and less expensive. 156
Consumer Reports, a reviewer of consumer products and services,
recommends consumers try the generic whenever possible, and also
mentions that in most cases, your pharmacist can give you the generic
instead of the brand-name, even when the prescription is for the branded
drug. 157  Further, some states, such as Kentucky, have passed statutes
that require their pharmacists to substitute branded drugs for their
generic equivalents unless the prescription specifically states
otherwise. 1 It is important to note that none of the previous sources
mention that use of a generic drug may limit the legal remedies that
might otherwise be available through use of a branded counterpart. This
information leads to the shocking realization that many consumers are
receiving generic drugs without fully understanding the potential
155. Scott Hensley, 3 in 4 U.S. Prescriptions Are Now For Generic Drugs, NPR.ORG (Apr. 20,
2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/05/16/135538006/3-in-4-prescriptions-are-now-for-
generic-drugs
156. CVS.COM, Switching to a Generic Could Help You Save,
http://www.cvs.com/content/generics (last visited Aug. 16, 2016); see also WALGREENS.COM, GENERIC
MEDICATIONS,
http://www.walgreens.com/topic/faq/questionandanswer.jsp?questionTierld=700006&faqld=6000026
(the Walgreens FAQ section describes generics as equivalent to their brand name counterparts, cheaper,
and just as safe) (last visited Aug. 16, 2016); KROGER.COM, DRUG INFORMATION,
https://www.kroger.com/topic/drug-information (noting that pharmacists will often recommend generic
versions of medications to save customers money).
157. CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, GENERIC DRUGS: THE SAME MEDICINE FOR LESS MONEY,,
https://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/pdf/best-buy-drugs/money-saving-
guides/english/GenericDrugs-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
158. K.R.S. § 217.822(1) ("When a pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name drug...
he shall select a lower priced therapeutically equivalent drug ... unless otherwise instructed by the
purchaser or his physician."); see also OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS (2010),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/genericdrugs/ib.shtml (stating that as of 2010, fourteen states have
these type of mandates while the remaining thirty-six states still allow for substitution though it is not
mandated).
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consequences of their decisions.
The majority in Mensing noted that allowing a state claim against a
branded manufacturer, while finding preemption in state claims against
a generic manufacturer, "made little sense." 159  This problem is
intensified when most consumers will be given a generic form of a drug
without even realizing that they are receiving the generic form, rather
than its branded counterpart. Though pharmacists continue to stress to
consumers that generics are chemically equivalent to their branded
counterparts and equally safe, after the holding in Mensing, many courts
will undoubtedly allow for plaintiffs to bring claims against branded
manufacturers only, thus stripping away much needed consumer
protections.
To assume that Congress intended for the FDCA to deprive injured
parties of their ability to bring otherwise viable actions under state law
ignores common sense. Any rational individual would believe that the
FDCA was enacted to protect consumers from inadequate warning
labels and to encourage drug manufacturers, both generic and branded,
to maintain high quality and safe products. The Fourth Circuit should
have taken note of these considerations when determining whether
Drager's claim was preempted.
C. Possible Remedies
With the Supreme Court's holding in Mensing, it appears that this
issue may need to be resolved outside of the judicial system. The
current precedent set forth by the Supreme Court is both difficult to
understand and nonsensical. The Court itself has mentioned that the
availability of bringing suit against branded manufacturers, while being
foreclosed from bringing a similar suit against a generic manufacturer, is
strange. There are a few ways in which this issue could be resolved
outside of the judiciary. First, Congress itself could pass legislation that
explicitly allows for plaintiffs to bring state law claims against generic
manufacturers. Second, the FDA could amend the policies governing
the labeling process for generic manufacturers. Both of these remedies
would resolve the current circuit split and allow for injured parties to
recover.
1. Congress Should Pass Legislation Allowing for State Law Claims
The current disagreement on this issue arises solely from lower courts
disagreeing on whether a plaintiffs' state law failure to warn tort claims
159. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
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are preempted by federal law. Because the FDCA does not explicitly set
forth that these types of state law claims are preempted, courts have
dismissed plaintiffs' claims based on a version of implied preemption:
conflict preemption. This preemption involves either: (1) an inability to
comply with both federal and state standards; or (2) a state law that
stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. 160 The
increasing dispersal and usage of generic drugs by both pharmacists and
consumers indicate that Congress needs to explicitly state whether or not
the purpose and objective of the FDCA is to completely occupy this
field.
Because of the public importance of drug safety for all citizens,
Congress needs to resolve this issue. The Supreme Court noted in
Mensing that "it is not this Court's task to decide whether the statutory
scheme established by Congress is unusual or even bizarre" and that
"Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change the law and
regulations if they so desire." 161 It is time for Congress to take the
initiative and expressly state that the FDCA does not preempt such
claims. Without this remedy, many consumers will lose their right to
bring suit against manufacturers without having a choice in the matter.
This undermines Congress's purpose in enacting the FDCA and
weakens safety regulations for the pharmaceuticals that citizens
consume. As the dissent in Mensing stressed, the current distinction
between branded and generic manufacturers "threatens to reduce
demand for generics" and "may pose 'an ethical dilemma for prescribing
physicians. ' 62 It is hard to fathom that the intent of Congress was to
create such a distinction. Congress should use its power to make an
express statement on its intent surrounding this issue.
2. The FDA Should Allow Generic Manufacturers to Unilaterally
Update Warning Labels
Aside from Congress's ability to expressly state whether it intended
to preempt tort claims against generic manufactures, the FDA has the
ability to amend its rules and procedures to allow for generic
manufacturers to better satisfy state law duties. Currently, FDA
regulations require that warning labels be updated when "there is
reasonable evidence of a serious hazard with a drug." 163 At the same
time, however, generic manufacturers have a duty under FDA
160. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
161. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011).
162. Id. at 2593.
163. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2015).
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regulations to have the same labels as their branded counterparts. 164
These requirements are the basis of the impossibility that some courts
claim preempt state tort claims by plaintiffs.
This purported impossibility on the part of generic manufacturers
could be relieved by the FDA by a change to the regulations for
updating warning labels. An easy fix the FDA should implement is a
mechanism to allow generic manufacturers to unilaterally update labels
of generic drugs when relevant safety information is available. This
change would allow generic manufacturers to more easily satisfy state
law duties and alleviate all concerns of federal preemption.
Additionally, this change would place more importance on both branded
and generic manufacturers' efforts to continue monitoring the safety of
the drugs they produce. This continued effort to maintain quality safety
standards benefits society and the public as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
As pharmacists and legislatures continue to push for generic drug
usage, courts must afford consumers the same legal remedies, regardless
of whether consumers use the generic or branded form of a drug. The
current circuit split surrounding this issue has already barred multiple
victims from recovery, and this trend is certain to continue in the future.
Generic drugs are substituted for their branded equivalents every day,
while those receiving the drugs are told that they are identical and work
just as well. While the effectiveness of the drugs may be identical, the
legal rights afforded to consumers are not. Therefore, many people are
receiving generic drugs without realizing that, in some jurisdictions,
they are relinquishing their ability to recover from the manufacturers.
To solve this issue, Congress should expressly articulate whether state
tort claims against generic manufacturers pose an obstacle to Congress'
purposes and objectives of current federal law. This solution gives a
concrete answer to the federal preemption question and allows for a
more logical statutory scheme. The FDA should also change its
regulations governing the procedure for updating warning labels. To
better promote overall safety, the FDA should amend the current
procedures to allow for, and require, generic manufacturers to seek out
new complications with drugs. It should also impose a duty upon
generic manufacturers to update their labels, even in circumstances
where the branded counterparts have failed to do so. This change would
promote overall safety for the general public and benefit society as a
whole.
164. Id. § 314.150(b)(10).
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